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I. INTRODUCTION
T he Enron scandal of 2001 was an American tragedy. Thousands of
Enron employees were left without jobs and pensions when the
company collapsed.' The shady accounting techniques and ghastly
decisions made by Enron executives were widely publicized and met with
scathing reprimands from the public.2 Sadly, Enron' s attorneys also played
a key role in the company's collapse.3 Through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Congress sought to curtail unlawful business practices not only
through more accounting oversight, but also with new guidelines for
attorneys who represented corporations.4 Congress, through the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "the Commission"), mandated that
corporate attorneys who discover fraudulent conduct by managers must
report the malfeasance all the way up to the board of directors if necessary.5
But the SEC wants to go one step further. If a company's board of
directors does not bring fraudulent conduct to an end, the Commission
proposes a mandatory noisy withdrawal for outside counsel.6 The SEC
would require outside counsel to withdraw from serving her corporate
client, renounce any work done by the attorney that she deems objection-
able, and notify the SEC of these actions.7
Critics see the noisy withdrawal as effectively turning the client over
to enforcement authorities.' They claim this provision tramples on the
1See Greg Hitt & Tom Hamburger, Skilling Denies He Misled Enron Officials:
Former Top Executive Offers a Feisty Defense Brief to Skeptical Senators, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 27, 2002, at A3, 2002 WL-WSJ 3387146.
2See David Wessel, Capital: When Standards Are Unacceptable, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 7, 2002, at Al, 2002 WL-WSJ 338258; David Wessel, Capital/Enron and a
Bigger Ill: Americans Don't Save, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2002, at Al, 2002 WL-
WSJ 3388002 (asserting that the news of Enron's collapse is so significant that it
receives as much attention at the dinner table as in the boardroom).
3 See infra notes 64-114 and accompanying text.
4 See Michael Schroeder, SEC to Propose New Financial-Disclosure Rules,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2002, at AI0, 2002 WL-WSJ 3410200.
' See infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 128-42 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 128-42 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
confidential relationship between a corporation and its attorney.9 Manda-
tory withdrawal with a notification procedure, however, is consistent with
ethical principles and necessary to strengthen the integrity of the United
States' financial system in the wake of Enron.
II. ENRON' 0
In December 2001, Enron, a Houston-based energy corporation, filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in what was the largest bankruptcy
filing in United States history." In one year, Enron's market value
plummeted from approximately $77 billion to $500 million. 2 As the price
of Enron's stock fell (from over $80 to less than $1 in a year), Enron
executives realized capital gains exceeding $1 billion on the sale of their
personal shares, while Enron employees were barred from selling the shares
in their company 401 (k) pension accounts. 3 Financial regulators were at a
loss as to how such a powerful company could fall so suddenly. 4 Thou-
sands of out of work Enron employees and devastated investors prompted
Congress to spring into action. ' Congress was determined to discover what
happened with Enron and address the flaws in the nation's financial system
to make sure such a collapse never happened again. 6
A. "Iam incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting
scandals. "17
Enron was the top energy dealer in the nation, and it was ruined almost
overnight.' 8 All of this was due to complex accounting tactics and unethical
9 See infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
10 Enron's auditor, Arthur Andersen, is arguably as culpable for the fraud as
Enron; however, auditor liability is beyond the scope of this Note.
" See What's News, Business and Finance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A1,
2001 WL-WSJ 29679584; Michael Schroeder, Enron Debacle Spurs Calls for
Controls, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2001, at A4, 2001 WL-WSJ 29680795.
12 See Michael Schroeder & Greg ip, Out of Reach: The Enron Debacle
Spotlights Huge Void in Financial Regulation, Energy Firm Lobbied Hard to Limit
the Oversight of Its Trading Operations, Keeping Ms. Born at Bay, WALL St. J.,
Dec. 13, 2001, at Al, 2001 WL-WSJ 29680609.
13 See Schroeder, supra note 11.
1 See Schroeder & Ip, supra note 12.
1 See Schroeder, supra note 11.
'6 See Schroeder & Ip, supra note 12.
'7 Michael Schroeder & John Emshwiller, Letter to Lay Prompts Queries to
Enron/Law Firm Was Directed Not to Second-Guess Auditor Arthur Andersen,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2002 at A3, 2002 WL-WSJ 3382961 (quoting Enron
executive Sherron Watkins, a main Enron whistle blower).
18 See Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Business World: Enron Is History, Says History,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2001, at A19, 2001 WL-WSJ 29679071.
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decisions by Enron's top executives.19 Enron's implosion centered on its
use of a distinctive type of partnership called a Special Purpose Entity
("SPE"). These familiar "off-balance-sheet structures" enabled Enron "to
increase leverage without having to report debt on their balance sheet."2
Under accounting rules, the sponsoring company of a SPE may omit the
SPE assets and liabilities from its financial statements, while the SPE
retains the risks and rewards of the investment.2' The exposure of the
sponsoring company's assets is offthe balance sheet, allowing the company
to hide the amount of financial risk it is taking on with those assets.22 As a
result, a company can hide debt to protect its credit rating. Enron employed
hundreds, possibly thousands of these tactics.23 But by using these SPEs,
Enron went deeper and deeper into a hole that eventually swallowed the
company.
Enron's fall started with a 1997 deal with a SPE called JEDI. 24 Enron
sought to buy a 50% stake in JEDI that a public employee retirement fund
held, then turn around and sell that interest to a newly created SPE called
Chewco.25 Chewco was independent of Enron in order to conceal several
hundred million dollars of debt associated with the JEDI deal from Enron's
balance sheet.26
This was a well-designed plan to hide debt, so long as Chewco lived up
to certain financing requirements. But the SPE failed. For Chewco to be
truly independent of Enron, its capital structure needed to meet minimum
outside equity requirements.27 In November of 2001, Enron acknowledged
that Chewco never met these standards. 28 In doing so, Enron conceded that
it had improperly inflated its earnings by $400 million over four years.
29
19 Id.
20 Joe Berardino, Enron: A Wake-Up Call, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2001, A18,
2001 WL-WSJ 29679750.
21 Id.
22 
Id.
23 See John R. Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Murky Watters: A Primer on
Enron Partnerships/As Details Surface, They Appear Central In Firm 's Collapse,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2002 at C1, 2002 WL-WSJ 3383411.
24 See Ellen Joan Pollock, Limited Partners: Lawyers for Enron Faulted Its
Deals, Didn't Force IssueiVinson & Elkins Rejects Idea Firm Should Have Taken
Doubts to Client's Board/Face to Face With Fastow, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002,
at A 1, 2002 WL-WSJ 3395589 [hereinafter Pollock, Limited Partners].
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 id.
28 id.
29 id.
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Once investors discovered this shell game that hid hundreds of millions of
dollars in debt, they started to lose confidence in the company and sold
their stock.30
Enron also used SPEs to artificially inflate the value of its assets to
make the company appear more attractive. Businesses, like other investors,
often invest in other companies to earn a positive return to offset any
investment losses. 3' This technique is called hedging. 32 Enron employed
this practice as well but failed since it effectively hedged with itself.
33
Few financial experts believe Enron created true investment hedges.34
Instead, Enron hedged its investments by creating SPEs, the most notorious
being Condor and the Raptors, to be their independent investors for a hedge
transaction. 35 The SPEs would go into the market for Enron and negotiate
a stock purchase like an outside investor.36 To finance these transactions
Enron would lend Condor, for example, $800 million worth of Enron's own
stock to make the trade.37 Enron would record the amount Condor owed it
for the loan as a receivable, an asset, on Enron's balance sheet.38 The
increase in assets would increase Enron's shareholder equity. 39 Thus,
30 Daniel Kadlec, Who's Accountable? Inside the Growing Enron Scandal:
How Evidence Was Shredded and Top Executives Fished for a Bailout as the
Company Imploded, TIME, Jan. 21, 2002, at 28, 31, available at 2002 WL
8385556.
31 Michael Duffy, What Did They KnowAnd... When Did They Know It? Meet
Sherron Watkins, Who Sounded the Alarm on Enron Long Before its Collapse,
TIME, Jan. 28, 2002, at 16, 2002 WL 8385615.
32 Hedging occurs when a company, seeking to minimize the downside risk of
a volatile investment, will pay an outside investor to accept the risk of a negative
investment return. Should the investment fail, the outside investor will pay the
company the difference between the money loaned and the loss on the investment.
Consequently, the company reduces its downside risk of the investment. See
Michael L. Fox, To Tell Or Not To Tell: Legal Ethics and Disclosure After Enron,
2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 867, 871 (2002).
" Id. at 873.
34 Id. at 871.
'5 See Duffy, supra note 31, at 20.36 id.
37 id.
38 Id.
39 Recording a stock loan as an increase in account receivables and as an
increase in shareholder equity before getting a cash payment for the loan violates
generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"). Jonathan Weil, Basic
Principle ofAccounting Tripped Enron, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2001 at Cl, 2001
WL-WSJ 29677610.
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through its SPEs, Enron appeared to have more equity than it actually had
by essentially loaning itself money.
This type of balance sheet manipulation would only work if the stock
the SPE invested in became more valuable.4 ° The only way the SPE could
pay Enron back for its hedge/loan would be with the capital gains it earned
on the investment.4' Because Enron named itself guarantor in each SPE
loan, however, it would be required to issue more of its own stock if the
SPE defaulted.42 This would be problematic if the SPE investments
declined in value along with Enron's stock value.43 If the hedged invest-
ments decreased in value along with Enron's stock, it would increase
Enron's risk exposure rather than steady it as a proper hedge would.44
This became a reality when some of the SPEs' (in particular the
Raptors) share holdings began to decline. The Raptor's investments in
Avici, a network-equipment supplier, dropped 98% from $178 million to
$5 million.45 Their interest in New Power Co., an energy retailer, went from
$40 to $6 per share.46 Since the Raptors were funded with Enron stock, the
cash needed to cover the hedged investment's losses was not available.47 In
order to keep the Raptors out of bankruptcy, Enron would have to issue the
SPEs more of Enron's stock in addition to the $550 million in stock it gave
the Raptors for its initial loan. This is exactly what took place.48
Enron could have ended the problem by absorbing the Raptors' losses
and booking a loss on its earnings reports, but it did not4 9 It decided to
perpetuate the problem by loaning the Raptors an additional $800 million
in Enron stock, and subsequently recording it as an account receivable
asset.50 Nevertheless, as the Raptors' investments continued to decline
along with the value of Enron's stock, the hedge collapsed.5 In the end, the
manipulation of the Raptors on Enron's financial statements caused
Enron's earnings to be overstated by more than $1 billion.52 As an
40 See Duffy, supra note 31, at 21.
41 See Fox, supra note 32, at 872.
42 Id. at 873-74; see also Duffy, supra note 31, at 21.
" See Fox, supra note 32, at 874.
44id.
45 This was a clear conflict of interest investment because one member of New
Power Co.'s board of directors was Kenneth Lay, an Enron officer. See Duffy,
supra note 31, at 19, 21.
46 See id. at 19, 21.
47 See Fox, supra note 32, at 874.
48 See Duffy, supra note 31, at 19-21; see also Fox, supra note 32, at 873-74.
41 See Fox, supra note 32, at 874.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 id.
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investigator for the Enron board of directors described it, "70 percent of
Enron's reported earnings for that period of time did not exist '53 and
"'[e]ven if the hedges had not failed . . ., the Raptors would have paid
Enron with the stock that Enron had provided [to them] in the first place;
Enron would simply have paid itself back.'
5 4
The fallout from these schemes was catastrophic. Investors across the
country saw their retirement savings wiped out as Enron shares went from
their $82 high in January 2001 to just $0.26 by the end of the year.55
Enron's 21,000 workers saw their $2.1 billion retirement fund nearly vanish
because half of the fund was invested in Enron stock.56 Interestingly, when
word of Enron's overstatement of earnings came out in October before the
December 2001 bankruptcy filing, some of Enron's employees considered
divesting themselves of Enron stock. But Enron executives, hoping to
postpone a stock market collapse, sent E-mails to the workers to convince
them not to sell.58 Subsequently, the permitted pension plan or window for
the employees to sell their Enron interest closed. The employees had to
watch their stock lose thirty-five percent of its value while Enron execu-
tives cashed out their holdings for millions.59
Enron employees were not the only victims. Many investors lost money
through mutual fund holdings that invested in Enron.60 Banks such as J.P.
Morgan Chase and Citigroup lost approximately $500 million and $400
million respectively in unsecured loans to Enron.6' Enron cost the state
pension funds of Ohio $69 million, New York $60 million, and California
$45 million.62 By the end of 2002, Enron faced 22,000 lawsuits alleging a
total of $400 billion worth of damages.63
53 Id.
541d. at 874 n.21 (quoting investigator Chairman Powers).
5 Marianne Lavelle & Matthew Benjamin, The Biggest Bust, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Dec. 10, 2001, at 34, 36, available at 2001 WL 30366299.
56 Id. at 36.
17 Id. at 34, 36.
58 Id. at 36.
'9 The Enron executives cashed out their investments in Enron earlier in the
year. Id.
60 In fact, "Alliance Capital, Janus Capital, and Fidelity Investments, plus
hundreds of other funds, had substantial positions in Enron." Id. at 34.
6' Daniel Kadlec, Power Failure; As Enron crashes, angry workers and share-
holders ask, Where were thefirm 's directors? The regulators? The stock analysts?,
TIME, Dec. 10, 2001, at 68-69, available at 2001 WL 29385633.
621 d. at 69.
63 Daren Fonda, Enron: Picking Over the Carcass, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 56,
available at 2002 WL 102387136 ("noting the plaintiffs included former
employees and investors").
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B. "Where were the lawyers?"'
The Houston law firm Vinson & Elkins was Enron's chief outside
counsel. 65 Enron was the law firm's biggest client, bringing in approxi-
mately $35.6 million, 7.8% of its revenue, in 2001.66 Vinson & Elkins
played a large role in creating the partnerships that brought down the
energy company.67 In spite of this, Vinson & Elkins attorneys did not
blindly do the bidding of their client. They expressed reservations about the
transactions to Enron's in-house lawyers. 6' They did not, however, report
their misgivings to Enron's board of directors or stand up to the chief
instigator of the fraudulent transactions, Enron's Chief Financial Officer
Andrew Fastow. 69 The deals that troubled Vinson & Elkins attorneys were
at the heart of the Enron scandal, and the law firm was viewed as a puppet
for Enron executives, especially Fastow.7 ° An investigative report for the
Enron board "criticized the law firm for an 'absence' of 'objective and
critical professional advice"' as to what Enron should have publicly
disclosed about its SPE transactions.71 Presently, Vinson & Elkins, just like
its client, faces numerous lawsuits.72
' Kadlec, supra note 61, at 69 (quoting John Dingell, ranking member of
House of Representatives Energy Committee).
65 See Pollock, Limited Partners, supra note 24.
66 Id.
67 See Fox, supra note 32, at 882.
68 See Pollock, Limited Partners, supra note 24.
69 id.
" This was the belief of Sherron Watkins in her memo to CEO Kenneth Lay.
See Tom Hamburger, Questioning the Books: Enron Memo Shows Watkins Urged
Lay To Restate Earnings, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2002, at A8, 2002 WL-WSJ
3385930.
" See Pollock, Limited Partners, supra note 24; see also Rebecca Smith & John
R. Emshwiller, Internal Probe ofEnron Finds Wide-Ranging A buses/Unanswered
in Board Report Are Some Big Questions Regarding Legal Liability, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 4. 2002, at A3, 2002 WL-WSJ 3384780 (quoting Enron internal investigative
report) (stating also that "Vinson & Elkins 'should have brought a stronger, more
objective and more critical voice' to the issue of what Enron needed to disclose
publicly about its partnership-related transactions").
72 Pollock, Limited Partners, supra note 24; see also Mitchell Pacelle & Ken
Brown, Enron Awaits Andersen-Suit Backlash/Investors SuingAccountancy Likely
Will Receive Fresh Support But No Help in Winning Cash, WALL ST. J., June 19,
2002, at Cl, 2002 WL-WSJ 3398270 (Vinson & Elkins, along with other
defendants had a suit filed against them "alleging that they participated in a scheme
with Enron to defraud shareholders and creditors."); Kathryn Kranhold & Jonathan
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Many members of Congress were bothered that Vinson & Elkins failed
to communicate the firm's disapproval of the transactions that brought
down the company to the board of directors.73 Nevertheless, Vinson &
Elkins's managing partner, Joseph Dilg, told Congress that lawyers may
advise, without endorsing, the business decision of their clients as long as
the transaction is legal and has been approved by the company's manage-
ment.74 According to Harry Reasoner, Vinson & Elkins's former managing
partner, Enron's protocol provided that Vinson & Elkins attorneys should
take concerns to Enron's in-house counsel.75 Accordingly, Vinson & Elkins
did not believe it was obligated to ensure Enron managers met their
fiduciary duties to Enron.7 6 Reasoner claims that Enron executives and in-
house lawyers were aware of the potential risks of the company's actions,
and Vinson & Elkins saw no need to report the transactions to the com-
pany's board.77
Against this backdrop, Ronald Astin, a partner at Vinson & Elkins,
became the firm's primary attorney for Enron and the person the company
used to develop its Chewco deal." When the Chewco deal was proposed,
Fastow named himself to manage and be allowed to personally invest in the
partnership, which would be categorized as doing business with Enron.79
Astin believed this would be a clear conflict of interest and a violation of
Fastow's fiduciary duties to Enron.8" Initially, Astin took his concerns to
Weil, Enron Holders 'Suit Adds New Defendants/Big Banks, Securities Firms Are
Targeted as Plaintiffs Seek to Recoup Losses, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2002, at A3,
2002 WL-WSJ 3390947.
73 See Ellen Joan Pollock, Andersen: Called to Account: Enron Lawyers Face
Congress Over Their Role, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2002, at C13, 2002 WL-WSJ
3388729 [hereinafter Pollock, Anderson: Called to Account].
71 See Pollock, Limited Partners, supra note 24.
75 Id.
76 d.
77 Id. ("The implication that we should have gone around their in-house lawyers
and their executives directly to the board, I would say we had no basis for believing
such an extraordinary action would have been appropriate or necessary.").
78 Id.; see also discussion of the Chewco SPE, supra Part lI.A.
79 See Pollock, Limited Partners, supra note 24.
'o Id.; see also Emshwiller & Smith, supra note 23. One reporter noted that
conflict of interest [was Astin's] biggest worry. The [SPE] partnerships did
hundreds of millions of dollars of transactions with Enron itself, in some
cases buying assets from the company or selling assets to it. The problem
is this: Where do the executives' loyalties lie? Are they trying to negotiate
the best deal for the company that employs them and the shareholders who
own the company, or the best deal for the partnership where they have an
ownership stake?
2003-2004]
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Dilg, his supervisor at Vinson & Elkins, and eventually the two attorneys,
along with Enron's in house counsel, met with Fastow to discuss the
matter."1 At first, Fastow resisted stepping down as Chewco's director, but
eventually relented to the attorneys' pleas. Nonetheless, Fastow simply
turned over the reins of the partnership to a lower ranking Enron manager
named Michael Kopper who, because of lower management status, was not
obligated to disclose his new position to the public. 2 Vinson & Elkins
attorneys still believed that appointing an Enron manager to a partnership
that would transact business with Enron was unwise because of the
potential personal benefit Kopper would receive from his new role. 3 The
attorneys' fears were well founded. When the details of the Chewco deal
were finally disclosed and Enron's earnings were restated, it was revealed
that Kopper earned at least $10 million from his role in Chewco, $2 million
of which was given to him without an identifiable purpose. 4
Soon after the Chewco deal was formed, Vinson & Elkins attorneys
clashed with Fastow again over matters concerning his fiduciary duties to
Enron. But this time Fastow refused to heed their advice not once, but
twice. In 1999, Fastow became a general partner of two SPE partnerships,
LJM and LJM2, which helped inflate Enron earnings just like the Raptors. 5
In order to do this, Fastow convinced Enron's audit committee, the body
charged with administering the company's code of ethics, to waive Enron's
conflicts of interest policy twice. 6 But the audit committee did not consult
Vinson & Elkins when it took this peculiar course of action. In fact, Enron
never asked Vinson & Elkins to provide oversight for its ethics policies.8 7
According to Vinson & Elkins, the decision "was presented to [them] as a
fait accompli.""8
Nevertheless, Vinson & Elkins knew it was a breach of Fastow's
fiduciary duties to engage in these deals, but the firm did not have the
Id.
81 See Pollock, Limited Partners, supra note 24.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See Smith & Emshwiller, supra note 71.
85 See Pollock, Limited Partners, supra note 24.
86 See id.; Joann S. Lublin, Inside, Outside Enron, Audit Panel Is Scrutinized]
Links to Company Of Certain Members Are Called Too Cozy, WALL ST. J., Feb.
1, 2002, at C1, 2002 WL-WSJ 3384720.
87 See Pollock, Limited Partners, supra note 24.
88 See id. (internal quotations omitted). Fait accompli means "a thing accom-
plished and presumably irreversible." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 417 (10th ed. 2002).
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courage to do anything about it. In 2001, Astin and some Enron in-house
attorneys agreed that Fastow must end his conflicted role with the SPEs,89
yet they never took these concerns to Enron's general counsel or any chief
Enron executive.9° Consequently, Enron's management and board relied on
Vinson & Elkins's tacit approval of the LJM deals.9'
Additionally, despite his protests, Astin helped conceal Fastow's con-
flict of interest in the company's 2001 proxy statement. Instead of sticking
to his convictions, Astin advised Enron that it was "technically correct" to
omit the amount of compensation Fastow earned from the LJM partnerships
from the proxy statement.92 Jordan Mintz, an Enron attorney who agreed
with Astin that Fastow must terminate his role in the partnerships, was
unhappy with this decision not to disclose the information in the proxy
solicitation and warned Fastow that "the rationale for not making the
disclosure might not be applicable in future [SEC] filings. 93
Following the bankruptcy filing, an internal investigation for Enron's
board reported Vinson & Elkins should have been more aggressive in
requiring Fastow to disclose his compensation in order to help the board of
directors make an informed decision on its omission in the proxy. The
report determined that "[t]he lawyers apparently searched for and embraced
a technical rationale to avoid that disclosure" and that Vinson & Elkins
"should have brought a stronger, more objective and more critical voice to
the disclosure process."' '94 Eventually, Fastow did disclose his interest in the
LJM partnerships. But in the end it was discovered that Fastow duped the
audit committee and Enron shareholders by personally earning $45 million
from the partnerships.9"
Before all of this came to light, Vinson & Elkins worked on a number
of deals concerning the LJM partnerships in which they stood up to Enron,
only to have the company get someone else to do its bidding. The firm's
role was writing "true sale" opinions for transactions in which Enron would
sell assets to LJM, just to have LJM sell them back to Enron.96 The true
sale opinions would certify the change in possession of legal title of the
89 See Pollock, Limited Partners, supra note 24.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. (It was "technically correct" to omit the amount of compensation "because
not all the LJM transactions were completed and thus the compensation was hard
to calculate.").
93 id.
94 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
95 Id.
96 id.
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assets. Astin and other Vinson & Elkins attorneys, however, were not
always convinced the transactions met the legal criteria required for such
opinions, and Enron developed an attitude that Vinson & Elkins could not
be relied on to close deals for it.97 Accordingly, Enron turned to another law
firm when Vinson & Elkins would not capitulate.98
Among the successes and failures ofVinson & Elkins to curtail Enron's
questionable activities, the firm's last assignment for the energy company
is the most notable. Vinson & Elkins was assigned to investigate the
concerns of the vice president for corporate development, Sherron Watkins.
Watkins was looking for assets to sell to obtain capital to help support
Enron and pull it out of financial trouble,99 but she kept running into
Enron's off-the-balance sheet SPE transactions, which no one could
explain. 00 Regardless, she learned that Enron was losing money on
investments backed by company stock, namely on the Condor and Raptors
deals.'' Watkins decided to write a letter to the new CEO Kenneth Lay
stating that she was "incredibly nervous that [Enron would] implode in a
wave of accounting scandals" and that "the business world [would]
consider [Enron's success] as nothing but an elaborate accounting hoax.""0 2
she later met with Lay about the matter and despite her fears of a conflict
of interest, Lay appointed Vinson & Elkins to investigate.
0 3
Vinson & Elkins' investigation was hindered before it even began. The
firm was instructed not to question the accounting techniques of Arthur
Andersen, the company's auditor, and not to investigate every
transaction. 1°4 The firm was relegated to conflicts of interests, the impact
97 id.
98 d. ("[T]here was 'an understanding at Enron that it would be easier to get
such an opinion from [Andrews & Kurth] than [Vinson & Elkins] because
[Andrews & Kurth] would raise less issues than [Vinson & Elkins].' ") (quoting
Enron's internal investigative report).
99 See Duffy, supra note 31, at 19.
" Id. (reporting that the veil of secrecy was such that at least one person was
transferred out of his position when he inquired about the transactions).
1' Id.; see also supra Part II.A for a discussion of the Condor and Raptors
deals.
"'02 Jeanne Cummings et al., Law Firm Reassured Enron on Accounting/Vinson
& Elkins Discounted Warnings by Employee About Dubious Dealings, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 16, 2002, at A18, 2002 WL-WSJ 3383123 (internal quotations omitted).
103 id.
o'Id.; see also Michael Schroeder & John Emshwiller, Letter to Lay Prompts
Queries to Enron/Law Firm Was Directed Not to Second-Guess Auditor Arthur
Andersen, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2002, at A3, 2002 WL-WSJ 3382961 (House
Energy and Commerce Committee Spokesman Ken Johnson stated the Vinson &
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of the SPEs on the company's financial statements, the need for public
disclosures of the SPEs, and the potential impact of decreased stock value
on Enron's financial statements.10 5
In every area, Vinson & Elkins deferred to Arthur Andersen and
reported to the board that Enron had done nothing wrong. In Vinson &
Elkins' mind, "'further widespread investigation by independent counsel
and auditors' was unwarranted."'0 6 By this time, Fastow had resigned from
his positions in the SPE partnerships, and Vinson & Elkins believed the
only thing to fear was "'bad cosmetics' involving the transactions and the
decline of Enron's stock [that] posed [a] 'serious risk of adverse publicity
and litigation. "" 07 Vinson & Elkins determined that Enron's use of SPEs
to hide its debt was "creative and aggressive" and technically proper.'0 8 The
day after the firm's report was given to Lay, Enron disclosed that it
incurred a $618 million loss in the 2001 third quarter. Thereafter the SPE
partnerships were exposed as having concealed the company's losses,
which led Enron to file for bankruptcy. 9 Dilg, Vinson & Elkins's
managing partner, maintained that the firm was confident in its investiga-
tion, while alluding to whom he believed to be the true culprit of the
scandal (i.e., Arthur Andersen) by stating, "We are not competent to render
accounting advice."" 0
Nevertheless, the transactions Vinson & Elkins performed for Enron
and its unwillingness to stand up to top management or go to the board of
directors helped the company fall into bankruptcy and cost investors
millions. The special Enron committee formed to investigate why the
company went bankrupt found Enron overflowing with corruption. The
theme of the committee's report was that for each transaction, Enron
officers were more interested in creating off-the-balance sheet entities to
boost the bottom-line than fulfilling their fiduciary duties to Enron."' The
Elkins investigation "has the appearance of a whitewash.") (internal quotations
omitted).
os See Cummings et al., supra note 102.
See Schroeder & Emshwiller, supra note 104 (quoting internal investigative
letter Vinson & Elkins wrote to Enron).
07 See id.; Cummings et al., supra note 102 (quoting investigative letter Vinson
& Elkins wrote to Enron following internal review by the law firm).
'08 See Cummings et al., supra note 102 (Max Hendricks III stated that "no one
[had] reason to believe that it [was] inappropriate from a technical standpoint.")
(internal quotations omitted).
109Id.
"0 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
". See Smith & Emshwiller, supra note 71.
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report found that many deals Enron's management engaged in simply
served no other purpose than to provide income for those same managers.' 
12
The report also found that Vinson & Elkins should have done more to
persuade Enron executives to disclose more about its off-the-balance sheet
transactions."' In its defense, Vinson & Elkins replied that it tried to be
more assertive and persuade more disclosure, but it was thwarted by one of
Enron's investor relations departments.'
14
11. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Congress acted quickly after Enron's fall. The outcry from disgruntled
investors was too much to bear." 5 Congress knew that it had to prevent
another corporate catastrophe, close the loopholes, and prohibit the
accounting practices that Enron and Arthur Andersen used to bilk
shareholders. The political atmosphere was ripe for regulating the
accounting industry with an iron fist, and as a result, Congress passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.216 President George W. Bush signed the bill
into law on July 30, 2002 and stated the Act would "deter and punish
corporate and accounting fraud and corruption, ensure justice for wrongdo-
ers, and protect the interests of workers and shareholders."".7
Congress knew that in order to obtain full compliance from American
businesses it would have to increase the duties and options for their
corporate attorneys as well. Consequently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed
the SEC to develop minimum standards of conduct and an up-the-ladder
investigation system for corporate attorneys."' With this charge from
112Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
"' See Pollock, Limited Partners, supra note 24.
..6 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
"' See Statement by President George W. Bush Upon Signing H.R. 3763, 38
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1286 (July 30,2002), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N.
543.
118 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, at §
307 (2002); 15 U.S.C. § 7245.
[T]he Commission shall issue rules, in the public interest and for the
protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional
conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in
any way in the representation of issuers, including a rule-
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the
company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief
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Congress, the SEC began to develop the rules that would define an
attorney's role in the battle against corporate fraud. By the time the SEC
was finished, many believed the Commission had overstepped its congres-
sional mandate and turned corporate attorneys into corporate watchdogs. "9
A. Up-the-Ladder: Attorney Reporting Requirements
Now that the SEC had its directive, it needed to develop rules that
would govern attorneys' behavior for reacting to managerial misconduct.
In order to meet its specific mandate from Congress, it used the Act's
language with some elaboration. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) states:
(1) If an attorney, appearing and practicing before the Commission
in the representation of an issuer, becomes aware of evidence of a
material violation by the issuer or by any officer, director, employee, or
agent of the issuer, the attorney shall report such evidence to the issuer's
chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) or to both the issuer's chief
legal officer and its chief executive officer (or the equivalents thereof)
forthwith ....
(3) Unless an attorney who has made a report under paragraph (b)(1)
of this section reasonably believes that the chief legal officer or the chief
executive officer of the issuer (or the equivalent thereof) has provided an
appropriate response within a reasonable time, the attorney shall report
the evidence of a material violation to:
(i) The audit committee of the issuer's board of directors;
(ii) Another committee of the board of directors ... ; or
(iii) The issuer's board of directors .... 120
executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence
(adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with
respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the
audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another
committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not
employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
119 See Mitchell Pacelle & Michael Schroeder, Proposed SECRules Could Turn
Lawyers Into Whistle-Blowers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2003, at A1, 2003 WL-WSJ
3956129.
120 Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing
Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)
(2003) (effective Aug. 5, 2003) (emphasis added). "The term 'issues' means every
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These provisions were in direct response to Vinson & Elkins' failure
to report the Enron executives' breaches of fiduciary duties and other
objectionable practices up-the-ladder. Section 205.3(b) makes an attorney's
duties clear when she is faced with corporate illegalities, 121 but these
obligations only arise when an attorney "becomes aware of evidence of a
material violation." 122 A material violation occurs when there is a material
violation of "United States federal or state security laws, a material breach
of a fiduciary duty arising under [those same laws], or a similar material
violation of any federal or state law."' 123 The SEC sought to make this an
objective standard because it believed a requirement of actual knowledge
was too high. 24 Accordingly, if a reasonable attorney believes it is
reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is
about to occur, then she is obligated to report it.1 2' The Commission opines
that for a material violation to be reasonably likely there "must be more
than a mere possibility, but it need not be more likely than not.' 26
Nevertheless, the attorney must have credible evidence before she can
reasonably conclude there has been or will be a material violation.
127
Now attorneys had their marching orders from the SEC on what to do
when they encountered fraudulent conduct by their corporate client. The
new regulations would increase accountability of company managers
person who issues or proposes to issue any security .... Securities Act of 1933,
§ 2(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4) (2003).
121 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68
Fed. Reg. 6296, 6306 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205);
see also Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing
Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c)
(2003) (effective Aug. 5, 2003) (allowing an attorney to report the material
violation to the company's qualified legal compliance committee, if there is one,
instead of the company's case in chief legal officer).
122 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b).
I23 d. § 205.2(i).
124 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68
Fed. Reg. at 6302 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205); see
also 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2003) (effective Aug. 5, 2003) ("(e) Evidence of a
material violation means credible evidence, based upon which it would be
unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not
to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is
ongoing, or is about to occur.").
125 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e).
126 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68
Fed. Reg. at 6302.
127 id.
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because their attorneys were now required to go over their head to report
a breach of fiduciary duties, something Vinson & Elkins refused to do. If
the reporting attorney was not reasonably satisfied with the findings of the
investigative body, she could then go over its head to the company board
of directors or a segregate body of the board. But what was an attorney to
do if all of these efforts failed and the corporation continued its fraudulent
activity?
B. Noisy Withdrawal: Attorneys Alerting the SEC oftheirResignation and
Objections to Company Filings'28
There is a potential problem after an attorney has complied with the up-
the-ladder reporting requirement. Despite an attorney's efforts, a company
may ignore his concerns and continue its fraudulent activity. To address
this issue, the SEC proposed a noisy withdrawal. The noisy withdrawal
would require corporate attorneys to withdraw from serving their client and
disaffirm any SEC filing if the company did not cease its threatened or
ongoing fraudulent conduct after the up-the-ladder reporting. 2 9 Proposed
section 205.3(d)(1) states:
Where an attorney who has reported evidence of a material violation...
[and] does not receive an appropriate response, or has not received a
response in a reasonable time, to his or her report, and the attorney
reasonably believes that a material violation is ongoing or is about to
occur and is likely to result in substantial injury to the financial interest
or property of the issuer or of investors:
128 This Note focuses on the original noisy withdrawal proposal from the SEC.
During the comment period for the new rule, an alternative provision developed
that would require an attorney to withdraw from the company and require the
company to notify the SEC. If the company did not notify the SEC, then the
attorney had the option to notify the Commission on his own. For the proposed
alternative, see Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6335-36 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 205). The author does not believe this is a viable alternative since it
depends on the company to notify the SEC. It is wishful thinking to believe a
company that is determined to break the law will comply with the notification
requirement. Thus, the alternative transforms the original SEC noisy withdrawal
into a withdrawal with the option to make noise.
129For past offenses, the noisy withdrawal is discretionary. See Implementation
of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,690
(proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
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(i) An attorney retained by the issuer shall:
(A) Withdraw forthwith from representing the issuer, indicating
that the withdrawal is based on professional considerations;
(B) Within one business day of withdrawing, give written notice
to the Commission of the attorney's withdrawal, indicating that
the withdrawal was based on professional considerations; and
(C) Promptly disaffirm to the Commission any opinion, docu-
ment, affirmation, representation, characterization, or the like in
a document filed with or submitted to the Commission, or
incorporated into such a document, that the attorney has pre-
pared or assisted in preparing and that the attorney reasonably
believes is or may be materially false or misleading.
1 30
This was a bold initiative for the SEC, one the Commission thought would
be rarely used and one "broadly based" on the American Bar Association's
("ABA" or "American Bar Association") Model Rules 1.13 and 1.16.131
The Commission admitted, however, that this proposal went beyond its
express directive from Congress and set a higher standard of compliance
than the up-the-ladder reporting.132 Nevertheless, the SEC believed that
situations involving determined, corrupt corporate managers would be rare,
and a high standard requiring noisy withdrawal was acceptable.
133
The proposed rule drew criticism in terms of its scope. 134 Some feared
that the proposed rule might require attorneys far removed from securities
30 Id. at 71,706. The rule for in-house counsel does not require withdrawal. It
provides:
(ii) An attorney employed by the issuer shall:
(A) Within one business day, notify the Commission in writing that he
or she intends to disaffirm some opinion, document, affirmation,
representation, characterization, or the like in a document filed with or
submitted to the Commission, or incorporated into such a document,
that the attorney has prepared or assisted in preparing and that the
attorney reasonably believes is or may be materially false or misleading;
and
(B) Promptly disaffirm to the Commission, in writing, any such
opinion, document, affirmation, representation, characterization, or the
like....
Id.
131 See id. at 71,688.
I32 d. at 71,689.
133 id.
134 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68
Fed. Reg. 6296, 6298 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.FR. pt. 205).
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practice to make a noisy withdrawal.135 But the SEC put most of those fears
to rest when it adopted its final rule defining what it means to appear or
practice before the Commission.
13 6
135 See Pacelle & Schroeder, supra note 119.
136 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68
Fed. Reg. at 6298.
The definition contained in the final rule addresses several of the concerns
raised by commentators. Attorneys who advise that, under the federal
securities laws, a particular document need not be incorporated into a filing,
registration statement or other submission to the Commission will be
covered by the revised definition. In addition, an attorney must have notice
that a document he or she is preparing or assisting in preparing will be
submitted to the Commission to be deemed to be "appearing and practicing"
under the revised definition. The definition in the final rule thereby also
clarifies that an attorney's preparation of a document (such as a contract)
which he or she never intended or had notice would be submitted to the
Commission, or incorporated into a document submitted to the Commission,
but which subsequently is submitted to the Commission as an exhibit to or
in connection with a filing, does not constitute "appearing and practicing"
before the Commission.
As discussed below, commentators also raised concerns regarding the
potential application of the rule to attorneys who, while admitted to practice
in a state or other United States jurisdiction, were not providing legal
services to an issuer. Under the final rule, attorneys need not serve in the
legal department of an issuer to be covered by the final rule, but they must
be providing legal services to an issuer within the context of an attorney-
client relationship. An attorney-client relationship may exist even in the
absence of a formal retainer or other agreement. Moreover, in some cases,
an attorney and an issuer may have an attorney-client relationship within the
meaning of the rule even though the attorney-client privilege would not be
available with respect to communications between the attorney and the
issuer.
The Commission intends that the issue whether an attorney-client
relationship exists for purposes of this part will be a federal question and,
in general, will turn on the expectations and understandings between the
attorney and the issuer. Thus, whether the provision of legal services under
particular circumstances would or would not establish an attorney-client
relationship under the state laws or ethics codes of the state where the
attorney practices or is admitted may be relevant to, but will not be
controlling on, the issue under this part. This portion of the definition will
also have the effect of excluding from coverage attorneys at public broker-
dealers and other issuers who are licensed to practice law and who may
transact business with the Commission, but who are not in the legal
department and do not provide legal services within the context of an
2003-2004]
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Despite the noisy part of the withdrawal, the Commission sought to
maintain the confidential relationship between an attorney and his client.
As discussed above, after all attempts to end illegal activity have failed, the
outside counsel is required to withdraw from serving his corporate client. '37
Thereafter, the attorney must notify the commission but only state that the
withdrawal was for professional considerations.3 ' Subsequently, the rule
provides that the attorney must disaffirm responsibility for "any opinion,
document, affirmation, representation, characterization, or the like in a
document filed with or submitted to the Commission, or incorporated into
such a document, that the attorney has prepared or assisted in preparing and
that the attorney reasonably believes is or may be materially false or
misleading." 139 If an attorney fails to comply with the noisy withdrawal
provisions, he will be subject to civil and/or disciplinary action by the
SEC.
140
The SEC believes these mandatory actions will be a "powerful
incentive" for corporate boards to eliminate internal corruption. 14' Because
of the certainty of an investigation by the Commission upon the attorney's
withdrawal, the rule will act as a deterrent to corporate fraud. Accordingly,
the Commission believes noisy withdrawals will be rare and in the best
interests of the investing public.'42
attorney-client relationship. Non-appearing foreign attorneys, as defined
below, also are not covered by this definition.
Id. at n.10.
"' See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. at 71,689.
38 See id. The Commission believed:
Use of the phrase "professional considerations" to explain the withdrawal
keeps confidential the particular facts underlying the withdrawal while
signaling that the withdrawal reflects substantially more than a disagree-
ment about the best legal strategy or a dispute over the cost of representa-
tion. A purely silent withdrawal would be likely to assist an issuer in
carrying out an ongoing or intended violation.
Id.
139 Id.
"4 An attorney who fails to comply with the regulation is liable to the SEC for
civil damages. If the attorney appears or practices before the Commission, then the
attorney may also be disciplined by either being temporarily or permanently barred
from practicing before the Commission. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(a)-(b) (2003)
(effective Aug. 5, 2003).
'4 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. at 71,689.
142 Id.
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IV. OPPOSING VIEWS
Opponents of the noisy withdrawal proposal have two key arguments.
Opponents contend, and the SEC acknowledges, 143 that the noisy with-
drawal goes beyond the Commission's express directions from Congress.'"
Furthermore, opponents argue that the noisy withdrawal will transform
attorneys into corporate watchdogs and cause management to exclude them
from meetings where confidential information is discussed. 45 The ABA
believes a noisy withdrawal could breach the duty of confidentiality and
"risk destroying the trust and confidence many [corporations] have up to
now placed in their legal counsel, creating divided loyalties.' ' 146 As a result,
corporate clients will not feel as free to discuss matters with their
attorneys. 147 Additionally, an attorney runs the risk of remaining unem-
ployed by complying with a required noisy withdrawal. 48 This problem can
be avoided if the attorney is left with the discretion to warn the SEC.
49
V. THE CONSISTENCY OF NOISY WITHDRAWAL WITH THE ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICAL THOUGHT
Many objections to the noisy withdrawal requirement rest on concerns
of maintaining client confidentiality. 50 It is true that noisy withdrawal
touches on confidentiality, but it also involves several other provisions of
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"). There-
fore, it is important to see how noisy withdrawal complies with the
principles that govern attorneys' professional conduct.
The Model Rules have been criticized for not going far enough to
protect the public from client fraud. 5 ' For that reason, it is significant to
" See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
'44 See Pacelle & Schroeder, supra note 119.
'4' See Richard B. Schmitt, Pitt Falls: Changes at the SEC: SEC Rules May
Face Noisy Dissent/Lawyers Could be Required to Stop Representing Clients They
Suspect of Misconduct, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2002, at C12, 2002 WL-WSJ
3410993.
'46 The ABA and Corporate Governance, ABA WATCH (The Federalist Soc'y
for Law and Pub. Policy Studies), Feb. 2003, at 9 (internal quotations omitted).
'41 See Michael Schroeder, Deals & Deal Makers: Some at SECRethinkLawyer
Rules, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2003, at C7, 2003 WL-WSJ 3956996.
'48 See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING § 9.31 (3d ed. Supp. 2003).
149 Id.
'50 See Schmitt, supra note 145.
151 The ABA and Corporate Governance, supra note 146, at 7.
2003-20041
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
point out where the Model Rules are lacking and how the SEC's noisy
withdrawal resolves the deficiency while remaining consistent with other
ethical standards in the Model Rules. This section will analyze the germane
sections of the 2002 version of the ABA Model Rules and their 2003
amendments to determine if the SEC's noisy withdrawal is consistent with
an attorney's ethical duties. It will also look at how the Commission's
provision closes the gap in the Model Rules.
5 2
A. Model Rule 1.6(b)(1)
An attorney has the duty of confidentiality to her client for any matter
related to the client's representation.'53 Generally, this means an attorney
cannot reveal her client's confidences. This is done, among other things, to
foster complete trust between attorney and client.'54 There are times when
this policy is superceded by higher societal values. In August 2003, the
ABA amended Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) and (3) to state:
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client
has used or is using the lawyer's services; [or]
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to
result or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or
fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's
services. 1
55
Accordingly, an attorney may disclose information that is adverse to the
client if it is necessary to protect the financial interests of another and when
the client has used or is using the attorney's services to commit a fraudulent
act.
I The 2002 Model Rules and their 2003 amendments are virtually brand new
and have not had time to be absorbed into the rules of professional conduct among
the states. As such, most of the commentary on the rules refers to the Model Rules
adopted in 1983.
' See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2002).
'54 Id. at cmt. 2.
Id. at R. 1.6(b)(2), (3) (2003).
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The exceptions are in line with the traditional view of client confidenti-
ality. Ethical standards for attorneys were first developed in 1908 with the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.'56 The Canons were developed to
ensure public confidence in the American judicial system. 57 Canon 37 set
out standards and limits for the lawyer's duty of confidentiality.' 58 It
provided that "[t]he announced intention of a client to commit a crime is
not included within the confidences which [the attorney] is bound to
respect. [The attorney] may properly make such disclosures as may be
necessary to prevent the act or protect those against whom it is
threatened."' 59 Thus, the initial rules of professional conduct valued the
protection of third parties to the detriment of client confidences in broader
circumstances. The 1908 standards controlled until the Model Code was
developed in 1970.160 The Model Code continued the Cannons' policy of
allowing attorneys to reveal confidential information in order to stop a
client from committing a crime.'
6'
Dissatisfied with the Model Code, the ABA set out to reform it through
the creation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 62 The Model
Rules were developed by the Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards which became known as the Kutak Commission. 63 The Kutak
Commission sought to go beyond the Model Codes with consideration of
the ethical debates that were present in the 1970s."6 With this in mind, the
Kutak Commission continued the preference for the prevention of unlawful
conduct of a client over the duty of confidentiality. The Commission's
156 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, pmbl. (1908), reprinted in
THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT AND OTHER SELECTED STANDARDS 677 (2003) [hereinafter MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, MODEL RULES].
15"Id.
158 Id.
159 id.
160Id. at n.*.
161 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(c)(3) (1981) provides:
"A lawyer may reveal:... (3) The intentions of his client to commit a crime and
the information necessary to prevent the crime." (footnotes omitted).
162 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preface (Discussion Draft 1980);
THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CALIFORNIA RULES EDITION OF THE
1980 STANDARDS SUPPLEMENT TO PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 67-68 (1980) [hereinafter MORGAN & ROTUNDA, CALIFORNIA
RULES].
163 MORGAN & ROTUNDA, CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 162, at 67-68.
164 id.
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proposed version of Rule 1.6(b) allowed an attorney to reveal what he
"reasonably believe[d] necessary" to prevent a criminal or fraudulent act
or to "rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act" in
which the client used the attorney's services to commit. 65 This proposal
was ultimately rejected. The ABA adopted Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) in 1983
without the crime or fraud provisions and allowed an attorney to disclose
a client's information only when it would prevent an act "likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm."'"
Opponents of the Kutak Commission's proposal had the same concerns
as the opponents of the SEC's noisy withdrawal provision. They believed
the Kutak Commission's proposal "transformed the lawyer into a 'police-
man' over a client,"'167 and this provision needed to be changed to place an
attorney in a better position to give advice to her client while maintaining
her ability to make a quiet withdrawal. 68 Supporters of Rule 1.6 believed
that limiting disclosure to the prevention of death or serious bodily harm
"struck the proper balance between the client's right to have confidences
protected and the public's right to be protected from criminal acts by the
client. '' 169
Ultimately, the Kutak Commission's vision would prevail. In 1991,
there was an attempt to amend Model Rule 1.6 to the Kutak Commission's
proposed version, but it failed. 70 Again, in 2002, the ABA refused to
extend the exception to include acts of client fraud.'7 ' Because of Enron,
the ABA reversed course in 2003 and amended Model Rule 1.6 to include
the crime or fraud exception.
72
The 2003 repentance of the ABA brings Rule 1.6 in line with contem-
porary ethical thought. Thirty-seven states already give attorneys the option
to disclose information to prevent a client from committing a criminally
165 STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES
AND STANDARDS 81 (2002) (1982 Draft of Model Rule 1.6(b)).
166 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983).
167 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 48 (1987) [hereinafter THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL
RULES].
168 id.
169 1d. at 49.
170 See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, MODEL RULES, supra note 156, at 196-97 n.*.
171 Id.
172 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3) (2003); Judith
Bums, Attorneys Face a Paradox in the SEC's Conduct Rules, WALL ST. J., Aug.
19, 2003, at C1, 2003 WL-WSJ 3977309.
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fraudulent act and four states require the attorney to disclose in such a
situation. 7 3 Moreover, in July 2002, the ABA's own Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility advised the ABA to extend Rule 1.6 to allow
attorneys to reveal confidential client information to prevent fraud.
17 4
Apparently, the ABA realized that the Kutak Commission's proposal and
the principles of the original ethical rules were a better approach to client
confidentiality than their obstinate limitation. These approaches to client
fraud also give a foundation in the rules of ethics for the SEC's noisy
withdrawal requirement.
Facially speaking, a noisy withdrawal is consistent with Model Rule
1.6 because the withdrawal is not a disclosure.' 75 Professor Geoffrey
Hazard maintains, "withdrawals do not reveal the content of information
the lawyer has gained in the course of the representation. By the same
token, it does not reveal the reasons for the withdrawal being
announced."'76 In theory, an attorney could withdraw from representing a
client, disaffirm an SEC filing, and notify a third party of the withdrawal
without disclosing any information.'77 The only requirement is that the
attorney must have withdrawn from representing her client before she gives
notice of the withdrawal. 7 Indeed, even the ABA Standing Committee on
Professional Ethics and Responsibility indicated in Formal Opinion 92-366
that after withdrawing, an attorney may have a duty to notify a third party
of the withdrawal and to disavow documents in order to prevent the
attorney from assisting with the client's fraudulent activity. 7 9 The
Committee "urged that where the only effective way to avoid further
'assistance' is to rectify the situation by 'waving a flag,' then rectification
may be made even at the cost of betraying client confidences.' '8 °
Interestingly, there is a noisy withdrawal option for attorneys who
desire to obstruct a client's fraudulent conduct and still be within the 2002
version of Model Rule 1.6. Comment 14 of Rule 1.6 provides:
'13 See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, MODEL RULES, supra note 156, at 166 (Appendix
A, Ethics Rules of Client Confidences § 2 Chart of Ethics Rules of Client
Confidences).
74 The ABA and Corporate Governance, supra note 146, at 3, 6-7.
175 See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 148, § 9.30 (3d ed. Supp. 2002).
176 id.
177 See id.
178 See id.
179 See id. § 9.31 (The Opinion "generated significant controversy, however,
and even provoked a rare (and quite caustic) dissent.").180 id.
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Neither this Rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer
from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also
withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like.
Where the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether
contemplated conduct will actually be carried out by the organiza-
tion .... 1s8
Thus, the comment allows attorneys to make a noisy withdrawal just like
the SEC's proposal. Even though this action would indicate something is
improper, it would not constitute a disclosure of confidential information." 2
This provision is ironic considering the ABA's long-standing rejection of
any rule allowing proactive conduct to prevent fraudulent acts in the
development of the Model Rules. 83 According to Hazard, this provision
"could create an exception broader than any proposed by the Kutak
Commission and rejected by the [ABA]."'" The ABA, however, deleted
this comment in its 2003 amendment to Rule 1.6.85
B. Model Rule 1.2(d)
Model Rule 1.2(d) is designed to prevent an attorney from participating
in a client's unlawful activity. The Rule states:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss
the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client
and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine
the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.1
86
The Rule essentially seeks to prevent an attorney from giving legal services
to clients who are going to engage in unlawful behavior with the attorney
as their accomplice."8 7
"81 MODEL RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCTR. 1.6 cmt. 14 (2002); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 15-17 (1983) (The 2002 version combined
all three comments.). This comment is the codified version of the original
comments. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 14-16 (1983).
182 See NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF
PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION 514 (2d ed. 2000).
183 See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 148, § 9.30.
184 Id.
185 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003).
186 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).
187 See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 148, § 5.2.
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Hazard maintains that "while a lawyer may discuss, explain, and
predict the consequences of proposed conduct that would constitute crime
or fraud, a lawyer may not counsel or assist in such conduct."' 8 If after
providing services, the attorney discovers those services have aided a
client's unlawful activity, the attorney must cease providing services for the
client.'89 To do otherwise would be to act with the knowledge that the
attorney is assisting in the unlawful conduct. 9 If a client demands
assistance with unlawful activity, the attorney must withdraw from serving
that client.' 9
The question remains as to whether withdrawing alone is sufficient for
an attorney to evade an accusation of participation in a client's fraudulent
act or whether the attorney must do so noisily to warn the client's intended
victim.' 92 The attorney that makes a noisy withdrawal protects herself from
liability. The ABA appears to take this position in Formal Opinion 92-366,
which states that when the attorney continues to serve the client on another
matter that is not related to the fraudulent transaction,'93 she otherwise
vouches for the client's conduct through her continued assistance as the
client's attorney.'94 Of course, an attorney could also warn the victim and
protect herself through the newly amended Rule 1.6(b), but that would
require the disclosure of confidential information.'95
C. Model Rule 1.13
Model Rule 1.13 sets the ethical standards for an attorney representing
a corporation. It was amended in August 2003 to respond to the Enron
catastrophe. 196 The Rule requires the attorney to view her representation as
serving the entity and not the individuals that direct the entity. 197 Addition-
ally, it allows up-the-ladder reporting comparable to the SEC's regulation
and allows disclosure of confidential information. If an attorney discovers
that a manager intends to engage or is engaging in a breach of fiduciary
duties or other fraudulent conduct, the Rule provides that the attorney:
' See l id. § 5.12.
'
8 9 See l id. § 5.16.
'90 See l id.
'9' See l id. § 5.12.
'92 See l id.
'93 See l id. § 5.16.
194 See l id.
"' See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3) (2003).
196 See Bums, supra note 172.
'9' See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 148, § 17.2 (3d ed. Supp. 2003).
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(b) ... shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization,
including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that
can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) ... if despite the lawyer's efforts... the highest authority that can act
(1) on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a
timely and appropriate manner an action or a refusal to act, that is
clearly a violation of law, and
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the
lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether
or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury
to the organization.1
98
Model Rule 1.13 operates almost exactly like the SEC' s up-the-ladder
provision.' 99 When an attorney discovers fraud within her corporate client,
she is required to look out for the best interests of the entity and prevent
harm to it. This is done by "refer[ring] the matter to higher authority in the
organization," even all the way up to the board of directors. 200 During the
referral process, the attorney must take steps to minimize the risk of
disclosure to persons outside of the entity.2 °' But, unlike the SEC's
provision, the Model Rule states if the entity's "highest authority insists
upon or fails to address threatened or ongoing" unlawful conduct, the
attorney is allowed to disclose confidential entity-client information to
prevent substantial injury to the entity-client.2 2
In view of the foregoing, it is important to note that the Kutak Commis-
sion's proposed language was significantly different from the adopted 1983
version of Model Rule 1.13. Part (c) of the Kutak Commission's proposal
provided for the disclosure of confidential information if the corporation's
highest authority insists on continuing unlawful action.0 3 It permitted an
attorney to take remedial action in such a situation, including "revealing
"' MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b)-(c) (2003); see also id. R.
1.13(d) (2003) (stating that section (c) does not apply when an attorney is hired "to
investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization... [for an]
alleged violation of law").
'99 See Bums, supra note 172; see also supra Part III.A (discussing the SEC's
up-the-ladder reporting requirements).
200 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003).
201 Id. cmt. 4.
211 Id. cmt. 6.
203 See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, MODEL RULES, supra note 156, at 216 n.*.
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information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6" if the attorney reasonably
believes the highest authority is seeking personal benefits adverse to the
entity-client and disclosure is in the best interests of the corporation.2"
Such a provision would go beyond the SEC' s proposed noisy withdrawal." 5
Nevertheless, the ABA initially adopted Rule 1.13(c) to allow only a quiet
withdrawal from the representation of an entity-client in the face of its
fraudulent acts,206 but the fallout from Enron persuaded the ABA to reverse
course and allow disclosure if the entity's highest authority did not cease
its fraudulent conduct.20 7 Additionally, some attorneys thought that by
amending the rule to require attorneys to report up-the-ladder, it might keep
the SEC from forcing attorneys to "report out" to the SEC.2" 8
It seems, however, that if the client is the entity and the highest
authoritative servants of the entity are reaping personal benefits contrary
to the interests of the entity, then a mandatory rule is more appropriate.
Model Rule 1.13 gives an attorney the ability to look out for the entity-
client's interests. Vinson & Elkins operated under a permissive disclosure
rule and it was unable to stop Enron's renegade management.20 9 Therefore,
if the entity is the true client, then going over the entity's highest authority
to disclose otherwise confidential information to a regulatory body is the
only way to protect the entity."' The SEC's noisy withdrawal accomplishes
this without full disclosure.
Furthermore, the ABA appears hypocritical by holding an entity-
client's confidential information more sacred than the secrets of a criminal
defendant.21 The Model Rules allow an attorney to disclose an entity-
client's confidential information to prevent fraud, but under the Model
Rules' candor to the tribunal provisions, criminal defense attorneys are
required to disclose a client's perjury to the court.212 Consequently,
corporate attorneys are better equipped than criminal defense attorneys to
204 Id.
205 For the discussion of noisy withdrawal, see supra Part III.B.
206 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (1983).
207 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2003).
2o See Bums, supra note 172.
209 See TEXAS RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.05(c)(7) (Texas allows attorneys
to disclose clients' "criminal or fraudulent" acts.).
210 See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 148, § 17.12.
21' Richard H. Underwood, What I Think That I Have Learned About Legal
Ethics, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 245, 261-62 (2003).
212 See id. at 262; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) and
cmt. 12 (2002).
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serve their clients and are allowed to hold their client's interests above the
public's interest.2"3
Additionally, as a matter of self-defense, and as discussed with Model
Rule 1.2(d) above, an attorney may have to make a noisy withdrawal to
avoid liability as a participant in the fraudulent conduct.214 Hazard states:
[If a] lawyer became convinced that the entire hierarchy of an organiza-
tion was engaged in a serious and ongoing fraud, the lawyer would be
required to withdraw from the representation under Rule 1.16(a)... and
might in addition be permitted to reveal the reasons for withdrawal to
successor counsel or to the victims.
215
Clearly, this point of view is in line with the SEC's noisy withdrawal.
D. Model Rule 4. 1(b)
Model Rule 4.1 (b) speaks to what an attorney must do in order to avoid
assisting a client's illegal activity.2 16 The Rule identifies an attorney's
obligation to third parties to avoid assisting clients in their unlawful acts.
It provides: "In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly: ...(b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6. '"27 As stated, the attorney must have
knowledge of the client's unlawful acts before her obligation arises.
Knowledge is defined as actual knowledge, but knowledge may be inferred
from the surrounding circumstances. 2I Therefore, the attorney who
unwittingly participates with a client and fails to correct the situation is not
responsible.219
It is important to note the interaction of Model Rule 4.1 (b) with Model
Rules 1.2(d) and 1.6. It can be said that the literal language of Rule 4.1(b)
is not consistent with the latter provisions.220 This is most readily seen in
213 See Underwood, supra note 211, at 261-62.
214 See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 148, § 17.12.
2151d. § 17.11.
216 2 id. § 37.2.
217 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2002).
21 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT 390 (4th ed. 1999).
219 See 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 148, § 37.2 (3d ed. Supp. 2002).
220See 2 id.
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the potential for an attorney to assist a client's fraudulent activity,
prohibited by Rule 1.2(d), through silence allowed under Rule 1.6.221 In
order to harmonize these rules, Hazard maintains that Rule 1.2(d) must be
viewed as an exception to Rule 1.6 by forcing the attorney to disclose when
"not disclosing client confidences is the fraud. 222 Thus, Rules 1.2(d), 1.6,
and 4.1 (b) present a circular problem. 223 For when "silence assists client
fraud; the lawyer must therefore speak; she may not speak if prevented
from doing so by Rule 1.6; but Rule 1.6 does not prevent her from
speaking, for she is required by law-Rule 1.2(d)--to speak."'224 The
permissive disclosure of client fraud in Rule 1.6 mitigates this problem.225
As the Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society maintains, "Rule 4.1 (b)...
clearly requires a certain amount of flag-waving that will alert even the
most naive citizen to the fact that the lawyer's client has probably
concealed or misrepresented material facts.
226
The SEC's noisy withdrawal requirement answers the problem
presented by Rule 4.1(b). An attorney need not worry about failing to
disclose a material fact, furthering client fraud, or breaching the duty of
confidentiality under the SEC provision. The withdrawal and renunciation
of documents discloses all the material facts necessary to alert a client's
victim of impropriety and keeps the attorney from aiding the client in the
fraudulent act. Withdrawing for professional considerations also removes
the attorney from the client's service without disclosing any confidences.
Clearly, the noisy withdrawal puts an end to the wild carousel ride of Rule
4.1(b).
VI. SUGGESTED COURSE OF ACTION
How attorneys should respond in the face of corporate fraud is not a
new problem. Attorneys have allowed their corporate clients to defraud the
public before. In the 1990s the federal government collected over $100
million in settlements from law firms who assisted the savings and loan
industry in fraudulent activity.227 With the apparent reprise of history in the
221 2 id. § 37.5.
222 2 id.
223 2 id. § 37.6.
224 2 id.
225 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2003).
226 See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, MODEL RULES, supra note 156, at 161 n.*, 167-
68 n.3 (Appendix A, Ethics Rules on Client Confidences).
227 See Michael Orey & Richard B. Schrnitt, Enron Entangles Lawyers/Cases
Linked to Energy Giant Offer Behind-the-Scenes Look at Quandaries Attorneys
Face, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2002, at B1, 2002 WL-WSJ 3394087.
2003-2004]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
fall of Enron, there is a need for government intervention to prevent this
from happening again.
When Model Rule 1.6 was developed, some wanted to give attorneys
more discretion to disclose client confidences just as the Model Code
did.228 Drafters of the Rule found no evidence that the Model Code's
disclosure provisions had interfered with the attorney-client relationship.229
Supporters of a Model Code approach believed that after withdrawal,
attorneys might be subject to various sanctions for a client's unlawful acts
unless they were allowed to disclose confidential information.230 The ABA
finally relented to these arguments in August 2003 .231 Hazard maintains:
It is preferable directly and openly to face the tension between preserving
confidentiality on the one hand and, on the other hand, avoiding involve-
ment in a client's fraud and rectifying the harm that the client has caused
by using the lawyer as an innocent dupe. A rule that openly acknowledged
the possibility of the disclosure would provide an occasion for frank
dialog between lawyer and client at an early stage, when candid advice
backed up with a threat to withdraw (and disclose) might still cause the
client to change course.
232
Certainly the Enron fallout caused the ABA to change its mind. But
corporate attorneys in a majority of states were already under permissive
disclosure rules.233 Therefore, the ABA's amended disclosure rules will
have little effect. To create the frank dialogue between lawyer and client
that Hazard envisions, a mandatory noisy withdrawal is needed.
While client confidentiality is an important ideal, a mandatory noisy
withdrawal furthers higher social values. Supporters of noisy withdrawal
believe that client confidentiality should be subservient to the prevention
of fraud.234 There is already a provision in the Model Rules for an attorney
to withdraw from serving a corporation after an attempt to remedy an
228 See supra Part V.A, notes 153-85 and corresponding text.
229 See THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES, supra note 167, at 49.
230 Id.
23 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2003) (allowing
permissive disclosure of confidential client information when a client commits
fraud).232 See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 148, § 9.30 (3d ed. Supp. 2003).
233 See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, MODEL RULES, supra note 156, at 166 (Appendix
A, Ethics Rules of Client Confidences § 2 Chart of Ethics Rules on Client
Confidences).234 See Schroeder, supra note 147.
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unlawful situation.23' The SEC simply seeks to make it mandatory.
Supporters maintain:
If the recent scandals and those of the past have taught us anything, it is
that the boards of some companies are either kept in the dark by manage-
ment or are reluctant to oppose management actions that are or may be
illegal. In those situations, illegal conduct will be stopped or rectified if
everyone knows that the company's attorneys will have to exit noisily. On
the other hand, if everyone knows that all an attorney can do, if the board
persists, is to exit quietly without any signal to anyone, the illegal conduct
may continue indefinitely and cause irreparable harm to the company, its
shareholders and investors.236
Indeed, the fall of Enron generated an atmosphere of public distrust of
corporations. A 2002 poll of potential jurors found that at least seventy-five
percent distrust corporations, up from an historical benchmark of fifty
percent in such polls. 237 In fact, an ABA task force on corporate governance
found "that a disturbing series of recent lapses in corporations involving
false or misleading financial statements and alleged misconduct by
executive officers has compromised investors' confidence in both the
quality and the integrity of public company governance." '238 The ABA
report found "the system of corporate governance at many public compa-
nies has failed dramatically. Moreover, the [ABA report] acknowledges
that attorneys representing and advising corporate clients bear some share
of the blame for this failure. 239
Therefore, the ability of a corporation to abuse the duty of confidential-
ity must end. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
recognizes the virtues of client confidentiality but understands that "con-
235 See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 148, § 17.3 (3d ed. Supp. 2002).
236 Susan P. Koniak et al., Comments on Proposed Rule: Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys 4 (Dec. 17, 2002), available at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/home2002/pdf/SECletter.pdf.
237 See John Gibeaut, FEAR and LOA THING in CORPORA TE AMERICA: Big
Business's Public Tribulations Have Led to Skeptical Juries, New Laws and In-
House Lawyers Working to Tighten Compliance, 89 A.B.A. J. 50, 52 (2003).
238 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68
Fed. Reg. 6324, 6325 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205)
(footnotes and internal quotations omitted).
239 id.
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fidentiality can also be exploited to violate the law. 24 ° It appreciates the
value of frank communication between an attorney and client, but
acknowledges that exceptions are needed to prevent abuse.24' Like Rule 1.6,
the Restatement asserts that an attorney may disclose a client's confidential
information to prevent fraud if certain conditions are met.242 An attorney
may reveal a client's confidences if the fraud "threatens substantial
financial loss" and either the client or his agent intend to commit the fraud
with the aid of an attorney.243 The Restatement and Rule 1.6 maintain that
when a client uses his attorney to perpetrate a fraud this exception is
justified on the principle "that the client is not entitled to the protection of
confidentiality when the client knowingly causes substantial financial
harm.",2" The Restatement also recognizes that the ability to take this
course of action could lessen "some clients' willingness to consult freely
with their lawyers." '245 Nevertheless, the Restatement maintains that "[t]he
social benefits of allowing a lawyer to prevent, mitigate, or rectify
substantial financial loss to intended victims of [a client's fraud] warrant
incurring [this] additional risk.
2146
Before an attorney may take this action, the Restatement and Model
Rule 1.6 require him to "make a good-faith effort to persuade the client not
to act" and to disclose only as a last resort.24 7 Thus, if the SEC up-the-
ladder reporting fails, it is a prima facie case of an attorney's inability to
persuade a client away from fraudulent conduct. The Restatement declares
an attorney must notify the client of his ability to disclose confidential
information under these conditions.2 48 An attorney "may also withdraw or
disaffirm opinion letters, affidavits, and other legal documents that had
been prepared for the client," which have been used to further the
240 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 5, introduc-
tory note (2000).
241 Id.
242 Id. § 67(1).
243 Id. § 67(1)-(2). Generally speaking, subsection (2) removes the issue of
whether the fraud has occurred or has yet to occur, since the attorney may disclose
under either condition.
244 Id. § 67 cmt. b. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 7
(2003) (noting that "abuse of the client-lawyer relationship by the client forfeits the
protection" of Rule 1.6).
245 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 67(l)-(2) (2000).
246 Id.
24 7 Id. § 67(3) and cmt. j; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d)
(2002); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2003).
248 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 67(3) (2000).
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fraudulent acts.24 9 Accordingly, the SEC noisy withdrawal is in line with
the Restatement.
While the Model Rules and the Restatement approaches to disclosure
are similar to the SEC's noisy withdrawal requirement, there is a significant
difference. Under the Model Rules and the Restatement, an entity-client
waives the duty of confidentiality when it uses an attorney's services for a
fraudulent act.250 Fundamentally, the SEC's proposed noisy withdrawal
provision does not go this far. It only requires an attorney to wash his hands
of the client and notify the Commission. 1 However, the Commission's
noisy withdrawal is more effective than the Model Rules and Restatement
approaches by giving an attorney leverage with a company's managers to
persuade them from fraudulent acts that harm the entity and the public.
The ABA maintains that the SEC's noisy withdrawal provision will
"risk destroying the trust and confidence many [corporations] have up to
now placed in their legal counsel, creating divided loyalties and driving a
wedge into the attorney-client relationship. 252 But a survey of 1200 in-
house attorneys found that forty-nine percent reported being "kept out of
the loop on some important financial and accounting" matters. 253 This
indicates that there is already a wedge in the attorney-client relationship on
the matters that caused Enron's fall, even though the noisy withdrawal has
not yet been implemented. 254 Furthermore, the ABA cannot ignore the
findings of its own task force on corporate governance that found the
public's faith in corporate governance is in decline.255 Attorneys have been
practicing under various state versions of the ABA Model Rules for
decades and cannot effectively restrain corporate fraud under their
permissive guidelines.256 Indeed, the ABA Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility "concluded that the Model Rules should be amended so as
24 9 Id. § 67 cmt. j.250 Id. § 67 cmt. e.
251 See supra Part III.B.
252 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. 6324, 6329 n.35 (internal quotations omitted).
253 See Gibeaut, supra note 237, at 55.
254 One could argue that a noisy withdrawal could make matters worse.
Nevertheless, attorneys and corporations have had ample opportunity to voluntarily
police themselves and have failed. Action must be taken. Short of complete
disclosure, the SEC noisy withdrawal requirement is the best option available.
255 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68
Fed. Reg. at 6325.
256 The ABA and Corporate Governance, supra note 146, at 7.
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better to protect the public from criminal or fraudulent conduct using a
lawyer's services, better to serve the interests of [entity-clients], and better
to guide lawyers in complying with their ethical obligations when serving
[entity-clients]." '257 The permissive amendments to Model Rules 1.6 and
1.13 were in direct response to this conclusion.2" However, Vinson &
Elkins operated under permissive disclosure rules and were not able to
restrain Enron's management.259 In fact, Vinson & Elkins buckled under
pressure from Enron executives when the firm knew it could disclose what
was going on at Enron.2' Therefore, mandatory responsibilities are needed
for corporate attorneys to prevent client fraud.
Without a mandatory noisy withdrawal, corporations will continue
fraudulent conduct despite the advice of their attorneys. A study commis-
sioned by the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois found that in a fraud case against Spiegel, Inc. prosecuted by the
SEC, "the absence of a 'noisy withdrawal' requirement allowed Spiegel to
keep investors and the SEC in the dark" to the company's fraudulent
conduct.261 Spiegel was charged with failing to file periodic reports with the
SEC and fraudulently withholding information about the financial health
of the company.262 The report found that, like Enron, "Spiegel's desperate
financial difficulties were compounded by a string of material accounting
irregularities lurking beneath the surface of its public disclosure. 26 3
Spiegel's principal outside counsel, Kirkland & Ellis, advised the
company's audit and board committees to make the appropriate
disclosures.2' Kirkland & Ellis maintained that it "repeatedly advised
Spiegel to file its SEC reports, repeatedly told Spiegel that failure to file
was a serious matter, gave its advice 'loudly and clearly,' and reported 'up
the line.' ,265 But the district court report found that "this was a case where
reporting 'up the ladder' was not enough. ' 26 Kirkland & Ellis believed
257 Id.
258 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 1.13 (2003).
259 See TEXAS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.05(c)(7) (allowing attorneys to
disclose confidential information to prevent client fraud).
260 See Pollock, supra note 24.
261 See Spiegel Examiner Says Noisy Withdrawal Would've Helped Bring
Wrongdoing to Light, 19 ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, No. 20, at 542 (Sept. 24, 2003).262 id.
263 Id. at 542-43.
264 Id. at 542.
265 Id. at 543 (quoting Jack Levin, a senior partner at Kirkland & Ellis).
266 Id. at 542.
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"that at a certain point Spiegel decided very clearly that they were not
going to follow [the firm's] advice." '267 Since Kirkland & Ellis were not
required to make a noisy withdrawal, they did not do so.268
The district court's report stated "that if the SEC's proposed noisy
withdrawal rule had been in effect, the SEC would have been alerted to
take action sooner and investors would have been kept abreast of develop-
ments at the company. 2 69 The report concluded, "[tihe lack of such a
requirement enabled Spiegel to hide the truth from investors and the
SEC. 27o
The SEC's noisy withdrawal is a device that could diminish or even
eliminate the possibility of another scandal like Enron. With a mandatory
provision, attorneys will have the necessary leverage to direct corporate
managers to comply with their legal and fiduciary duties. Additionally, the
rule will act as a deterrent. Use of noisy withdrawal will be kept at a
minimum because if the attorney is forced to notify the SEC of his
withdrawal, it is an absolute certainty that the SEC will initiate an
investigation. Had Vinson & Elkins been required to make a noisy
withdrawal, thousands of retirees' pensions, investor portfolios, and the
stock market as a whole could have been preserved.
VII. CONCLUSION
In light of the Enron collapse, new standards for attorneys are needed
to prevent another corporate failure from happening. Congress provided the
SEC with the power to create the tools it needed to prevent another Enron
scenario. One of those tools is noisy withdrawal. While controversial, the
noisy withdrawal provision is consistent with ethical responsibilities of
attorneys. In an atmosphere of corporate corruption there is a need for the
noisy withdrawal requirement to protect the interests of the investing
public.
267 Id. at 543.
268 Id.
269 id.
270 Id.
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